Worker-generated claims-reporting moral hazard is said to occur when, in order to collect workers' compensation benefits, workers report on-the-job injuries that never occurred or that occurred off the job. Using newly available injury micro data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics on all cases with days away from work, this article assesses the hypothesis that claims-reporting moral hazard is more likely to occur for hard-to-diagnose injuries than for easy-todiagnose cuts and fractures. Consistent with the hypothesis, multinomial logits indicate that an increase in the wage-replacement rate and a decrease in the benefit-waiting period increase the fraction of carpal tunnel syndrome cases relative to cuts and fractures, while a decrease in the waiting period increases back sprains relative to fractures. Contrary to the hypothesis that claimsreporting moral hazard differentially affects the timing of reported injuries, binomial logit estimates indicate that workers' compensation does not increase the probability of a Monday back sprain relative to a Monday cut or fracture. Rather, an increase in the wage-replacement rate and, possibly, worker choice of doctor increase the probability that an injury of any type is reported on Monday (or the day after a long weekend) relative to other regular workdays.
INTRODUCTION
Workers' compensation insurance provides coverage for medical treatment and partial replacement of lost wages in the event a worker is injured on the job. Employers are strictly liable for these benefits, covering their potential liabilities with insurance purchased from private or state insurers or, in some cases, by self-insuring. State laws determine the generosity of benefits, including the proportion of wages replaced and the waiting period prior to benefit payments. The laws also mandate how an injured worker can choose a treating physician. The existence of the workers' compensation system may affect the behavior of a variety of actors, i.e., workers, employers, insurers, and health care providers, in ways that alter injury frequencies, duration, and costs. Collectively, the impact of insurance on injury outcomes is termed moral hazard.
Workers' compensation can affect both true safety incentives and incentives to report injuries. More generous benefits may weaken workers' incentives to self-protect but may, depending on the extent to which premiums are tied to a firm's own loss experience, increase incentives for firms to invest in safety. These offsetting effects change the true level of safety. Workers' compensation may also alter incentives for reporting injuries without changing the true level of safety. Specifically, more generous benefits may increase workers' incentives to report off-the-job injuries as occurring on-the-job, to report injuries that don't exist, and to exaggerate the severity of their injuries. Conversely, more generous benefits may lead firms to resist filing claims for injuries that have occurred and to place injured workers on light duty rather than having them file claims for days away from work. Butler and Worrall (1991) term the reporting effects "claimsreporting moral hazard."
A number of empirical studies, many of which are reviewed in Smith, (1992) , have measured the effect of workers' compensation on the frequency and severity of occupational injuries and claims. A subset of this literature studies the impact of workers' compensation on the relative frequencies of specific types of injuries.
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These latter studies generally start from the hypothesis that worker generated claims-reporting moral hazard is more likely to occur for injuries that are hard to diagnose or whose work-relatedness is hard to establish. The implication is that more generous benefits increase the frequency of hard-to-diagnose injuries, such as back sprains, relative to easier-to-diagnose injuries like fractures and cuts. An implicit assumption needed to generate such a result empirically is that the effects of workers' compensation on true safety incentives and on firm-generated claimsreporting moral hazard are the same for all types of injuries.
The past evidence on the effect of higher benefits on the relative frequency of hard-to-diagnose injuries is not unequivocal but tends to support the hypothesis of worker-generated claims-reporting moral hazard. In three manufacturing plants, Robertson and Keeve (1983) finds that a higher maximum benefit increases the number of subjectively-verified injuries and claims such as back sprains and pain, but there was no effect of higher benefits on lacerations and fractures. In contrast, Welland (1986) , studying workers' compensation claims data for six states in 1976, finds that more generous weekly benefits decrease the proportions of sprains and contusions, but increase the proportions of easily diagnosed amputations, burns, fractures, and scratches. Welland also finds that, contrary to expectations; a longer waiting period prior to benefit payments increases sprains, but decreases amputations and cuts. In workers' compensation claims data for New York, Thomason (1993) shows that temporary total disability benefits are positively related to the proportion of sprains relative to fractures. In Bureau of Labor Statistics data, Ruser (1993) shows that higher benefits increased nonfatal injury rates (which include a high fraction of hard-to-diagnose sprains and strains) while reducing fatalities. Finally, Butler, Durbin, and Helvacian (1996) apply a methodology similar to the one utilized here to study the impact of moral hazard in state level workers' compensation claims data. They find that a higher wage replacement rate and a larger proportion of the population covered by HMOs both increases the relative frequency of sprains and strains. They also find that the proportion of fractures anomalously increases with the replacement rate, while cuts and "all other" injuries decline.
Two articles examine the issue of the timing of reported injuries. Smith (1990) argues that workers' compensation creates incentives for workers to report hard-to-diagnose off-the-job injuries as having occurred on the job. Since there are more off-the-job hours preceding Mondays and days after long weekends (referred to collectively as "Mondays") than before regular Tuesdays through Fridays, more off-the-job injuries occur prior to Mondays. Then, hard-to-diagnose injuries will be disproportionately reported on Mondays compared to other regular workdays.
Consistent with this hypothesis, Smith shows in workers' compensation claims data that a greater proportion of sprains and strains relative to fractures and cuts are reported earlier in the work week and work shift than at other work times. In contrast, Card and McCall (1996) present evidence suggesting that the greater frequency of higher Monday injuries is not due to workers' compensation. Using Minnesota workers' compensation claims data, they show that workers who are less likely to have health insurance coverage are not more likely to report injuries on Monday compared to other days, as would be expected if workers' try to use workers' compensation to provide health insurance. They also show that the wage replacement rate does not exert an independent effect on the probability of Monday injuries.
The present study contributes to this small body of literature by addressing two related questions. Does workers' compensation increase the frequency of hard-to-diagnose injuries relative to those that are easier to diagnose? And, does workers' compensation encourage the reporting of hard-to-diagnose injuries on Mondays? Although most previous studies utilize workers' compensation claims data; the present study analyzes micro data from a newly available, nationally representative U.S. survey of nonfatal workplace injuries with days away from work. This survey provides a wealth of control variables and, since injury reporting is uniform across all states, provides results that generalize to the U.S. workforce. Because the survey includes both compensable and noncompensable injuries, this study, in contrast to most others, estimates the effect of workers' compensation on all injuries with days away from work. The impact of three workers' compensation variables are assessed: The ratio of weekly workers' compensation benefits to the net of tax weekly wage (the wage replacement rate), the length of the waiting period before benefit payments begin, and an indicator of whether the worker can freely choose his or her own doctor. The study contains a more rigorous test of the Monday effect than is contained in Smith, since it examines whether the Monday effect is stronger when benefits are more generous or when workers can choose their own doctor.
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Multinomial logits are estimated to determine the impact of the workers' compensation variables on the relative probabilities of two types of minor injuries (back sprains and cuts and lacerations) and two types of major conditions (fractures and carpal tunnel syndrome). If the relative frequencies of injuries are driven by worker-generated claims reporting moral hazard, then, everything being equal, the frequency of back sprains and carpal tunnel syndrome should rise relative to fractures and cuts when the weekly benefit is higher, the waiting period is shorter, and the worker can choose his or her own doctor. Binary logit estimates are used to assess the impact of the three workers' compensation variables on the probability of a Monday injury. Everything else equal, if workergenerated claims-reporting moral hazard is more significant for hard-to-diagnose injuries, then more generous benefits and worker choice of doctor should increase the frequency of Monday back sprains relative to Monday cuts and fractures.
The empirical results show modest support for the hypothesis that the relative distribution of injuries is affected by worker-generated claims-reporting moral hazard. More generous weekly benefits and a shorter waiting period both increase the frequency of carpal tunnel syndrome cases relative to cuts and fractures, while a shorter waiting period increases the frequency of back sprain cases relative to fractures. However, with the exception of the replacement-rate effect on carpal tunnel syndrome, these effects are small in magnitude. Further, no statistically significant evidence indicates that the replacement rate affects the probability of a back sprain relative to a cut or fracture, nor is there any evidence that doctor choice affects the distribution of injuries.
Although Monday back sprains are more frequent than Monday cuts or fractures, the empirical evidence is clear that the workers' compensation variables do not increase the probability of a Monday back sprain relative to a Monday cut or fracture. Instead, the evidence suggests that the wage-replacement rate and, possibly, worker choice of doctor increase the probability of Monday injuries of all types. The finding for the wage-replacement rate contrasts with the only other published study of this effect, Card and McCall (1995) , who find no effect. Although there is no differential effect of the workers' compensation variables on Monday injuries by type of injury, these results are still consistent with workergenerated claims-reporting moral hazard that occurs for all injury types.
DATA
The source of injury and illness ("injury") data for this study is a 1992 survey of private industry establishments conducted by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).
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Data were collected for a nationally representative stratified random sample of over 550,000 nonfatal injury and illness cases involving at least one day away from work. The cases were sampled from records that employers maintain under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 and, in some cases; some data elements were obtained from workers' compensation agencies. When weighted, these cases represent over 2.3 million injuries and illnesses in 1992. The data set includes information about the establishment where each injury occurred, including state, industry, employment, and annual hours worked by all employees. The demographic characteristics of injured workers (occupation, gender, age, race, Hispanic ethnicity, and length of service) and case characteristics (date of occurrence, nature of injury, body part, cause, source, and duration of disability) were also collected.
These data differ from workers' compensation claims data in several ways. First, the BLS survey uses consistent reporting criteria across all states, permitting valid interstate comparisons of injuries. Reporting of injuries to workers' compensation agencies, particularly for the least severe cases, varies across states, limiting the ability of researchers to use claims data for cross-state comparisons. Second, the BLS data pertain to all injury cases with days away from work, regardless of compensability. In particular, the BLS data capture injury cases that are shorter in duration than some states' reporting minimums for workers' compensation cases (which are sometimes equal to the waiting period for benefit payments). This study, therefore, sheds light on how workers' compensation affects all injuries with days away from work, not simply those for which income benefits were paid. While it is likely that workers' compensation largely affects cases eligible for income benefits, it is also possible that non-compensated cases are affected, as when, for example, an employer decides to grant sick leave to an injured worker, rather than file a workers' compensation claim. The BLS data do not indicate whether a case was compensable and if the case was a temporary or permanent disability, making it difficult to compare results for all cases with days away from work with those for compensable cases. As a substitute, this article analyzes more severe cases (those with more than three days away from work), which are more likely to be compensable. 3 In addition to data on injuries, the survey collected data on illnesses. The survey seeks to measure the number of new work-related illness cases that are recognized, diagnosed, and reported during the year. Some conditions, for example, long-term latent illnesses caused by exposure to carcinogens, are often difficult to relate to the workplace and are not recognized and reported. In contrast, the overwhelming majority of newly reported illness cases are those which relate to workplace activities and are easy to identify. Injuries make up over 95 percent of all reported injuries and illnesses with days away from work. For convenience, I use "injuries" to mean both injuries and reported illnesses.
Studies of occupational injuries frequently analyze rates of injuries (per worker) in order to control for differences in the size of the exposed population. But while the BLS workplace safety and health survey can be used to estimate counts of injuries by establishment and worker characteristics, hours worked data are collected in the survey only for all workers in the establishment, not for subsets of the establishment's workforce. Thus, with the survey data alone, it is possible to calculate injury rates only by establishment characteristics, i.e., state, industry, and establishment size. Using these rates would limit this study to only those control variables. Mitchell (1988) suggests that occupation and age explain more of the variation in temporary disability rates than does industry. Temporary disabilities undoubtedly account for the vast majority of all reported cases in the BLS data, so it is desirable in this study to control for worker characteristics.
Two approaches suggest themselves. One is to generate BLS injury counts at the cell level and to match these to hours worked estimates by cell obtained from another data source, such as the BLS's Current Population Survey (CPS). This approach has two shortcomings. One is that sample sizes in a data set such as the CPS preclude estimation of hours worked for cells defined by all of the worker variables that are available in the BLS safety and health survey. Further, the CPS does not include all of the control variables available in the BLS survey. Thus, the analysis would be conducted without taking advantage of the full richness of the injury survey. In addition, since the injury survey is a sample, not all cells have estimated injury counts, even though the CPS may have positive hours worked estimates for some of those cells. In these cases, it seems natural to impute a zero value for the count of injuries for these cells. However, zero is a downward-biased estimate of the actual number of injuries, because the absence of an observed injury case in a cell may simply reflect the fact that the sample failed to draw one. 4 The research reported here employs an alternative empirical methodology that avoids the shortcomings enumerated above. A logit framework, described in the following section, estimates the relative probabilities of occurrence of different types of injuries. This technique permits the use of micro data from the injury survey alone and allows for a complete set of control variables for worker and establishment characteristics.
A wide variety of conditions are reported in the BLS injury data set. However, sprains and strains and other relatively minor injuries predominate. The injuries studied in this research are selected partially based on estimated frequencies and partially to include some that differ in severity and ease of verification. Four injury types were chosen: back sprains, cuts and lacerations, fractures, and carpal tunnel syndrome. The distinction between minor and major injuries is based on the median number of days away from work for each injury type. Back sprains and cuts are considered minor injuries, with median days away from work of 6 and 4, respectively. The two major injuries chosen for this study, fractures and carpal tunnel syndrome, have much longer median days away from work, 19 and 32 days, respectively. Fractures and cuts are considered easier to diagnose and relate to the workplace than the other two conditions.
The BLS injury file contains the date of injury occurrence or first recognition. This date determines whether an injury occurred on a Monday after a regular weekend (excluding holiday Mondays), on the first working weekday after a long weekend (based on federal holidays), or on a regular Tuesday through Friday. For the analysis of whether workers' compensation affects the relative frequencies of injuries occurring on Mondays, a dichotomous variable is created that takes the value one if the date of occurrence is either Monday or a day following a long weekend and zero otherwise. For the rest of this article, a "Monday" injury identifies an injury that occurred on either Monday or on the first weekday after a long weekend.
The complete file of micro data from the BLS injury survey is too large to analyze. For this study, a 25 percent random sample was drawn that excluded certain cases. To focus on "typical" cases, injuries that occurred on weekends and federal holidays, that occurred during the last two weeks of the year (around Christmas and New Year's Day) and that were sustained by workers under 18 and over 64 are excluded. Agriculture, which is not well represented in the data set due to sampling limitations, and railroads, for which some data elements are imputed, are also dropped, as are a small number of cases with missing age or gender.
Three variables are added to the data set to measure various aspects of each states' workers' compensation system. A crucial one is the proportion of a worker's net of tax weekly wage that is replaced by income benefits in the event of a compensable injury. If the worker's wage were collected in the BLS injury survey, this replacement rate could be calculated using the wage and information on each state's workers' compensation benefit payments. As a substitute in this research, the wage replacement rate is imputed using a regression equation estimated on the micro data from the 12 monthly Current Population Surveys for 1992.
For each observation with a weekly earnings value in the CPS microdata (one-quarter of each month's sample), the weekly temporary total disability benefit is calculated based on the relevant state's benefit formula as reported in the U.S. Chamber of Commerce's (1992) Analysis of Workers' Compensation Laws, and based on the worker's wage, marital status, and number of dependents. After calculating the pretax wage replacement ratio for each worker, an adjustment is made for the untaxed status of workers' compensation benefits. The pretax wage replacement rate is divided by 1 minus 0.28 (for federal taxes) and minus the marginal state income tax rate for a family with each state's median family income. This adjustment for taxes is admittedly crude and in principle could be improved upon by calculating a marginal federal and state income tax rate for each observation. However, this requires much more complex modeling of taxes and is beyond the scope of this study. The approach of this article is an improvement over other studies that do not adjust for taxes.
Five jurisdictions, the District of Columbia and four states (Alaska, Connecticut, Iowa, and Michigan), use a spendable-earnings formula to calculate benefits in 1992, rather than the simpler formula of all other states. Since calculation of benefits in these jurisdictions is computationally more difficult than calculating benefits in the other states and requires more information than is available in the monthly CPS files, these jurisdictions are dropped from the analysis.
Once the wage replacement rate is calculated for each observation in the CPS, its natural logarithm is used as the dependent variable in a regression on gender, age, age-squared, dummy variables for major occupation and major industry, and dummy variables for each state. The regression is estimated using sampling weights adjusted for hours worked. Approximately 123,000 observations from the CPS are used in the regression, and the resulting R 2 is 0.30. The magnitude of this R 2 is similar to those obtained for cross-sectional wage regressions. The regression equation is used to impute the log replacement rate for each observation in the BLS injury survey and this imputed value is exponentiated.
The imputed wage-replacement rate is less than ideal, because it may suffer from measurement error Employees that attenuates any estimated relationship between benefits and relative injury frequencies. However, even if the wage were available for each injured worker, it would not be appropriate to use a replacement rate calculated from it without statistical refinement. If workers' compensation generates moral hazard, individuals reporting injuries are more likely, everything else equal, to be those who have weekly wages associated with higher replacement rates.
Because benefits are capped, lower-wage workers receive higher replacement rates. Thus, injured workers tend to have lower wages than observationally equivalent workers do in the population. This is a classic selection problem, similar to the selection problem in estimating labor supply (higher wage workers are more likely to be found working) that can be corrected in the analysis by a Heckman correction, provided there are appropriate instruments. Alternatively, as done in this study, one can associate with each injury observation the average wage replacement rate for all workers (injured or not) with the attributes of the injured worker.
Two other state-specific workers' compensation parameters that could affect the relative frequencies of injuries are also added to the data set. These are the waiting period prior to the payment of income benefits and a dummy variable, indicating that the worker can freely choose his or her own doctor. Waiting periods are constant by state and range from three to seven days. In the literature, a waiting period is viewed as a deductible. A shorter waiting period is thus equivalent to more generous benefits, so that if claims-reporting moral hazard is present, a shorter waiting period should lead to higher frequencies of hard-to-diagnose -injuries. However, the waiting period may also play a different role for short duration injuries. Long waiting periods imply that injured workers are not compensated for short spells off work. Workers may try to "work through" even job-related short duration injuries, so that a longer waiting period may lead to relatively fewer short duration injuries of all types. For an example, if a worker does not expect to be paid any workers' compensation benefits because the injury is not likely to extend beyond the waiting period, then the worker may be less likely to take time off work. This effect might be especially important for cuts that have the shortest median duration of the injuries studied here.
The way that a doctor is selected in the event of a workplace injury varies by state. In some states, the employer chooses the doctor, while in others, the employee chooses the doctor from an employer or state-provided list. The most liberal approach allows the worker to freely choose his or her own doctor. Because state-provided lists generally include most doctors, selection from a state list is similar to allowing a worker free choice. The dummy variable used below takes the value one when an observation is in a state where the worker can either freely choose a doctor or choose one from a state list. It is hypothesized that, if a worker can voluntarily choose his or her own doctor, he or she is more likely to shop around for one who will support a work-related diagnosis for a hard-todiagnose injury. Both the waiting period and doctor choice variables are based on information from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (1992) .
Construction of the analysis data set led to 38,402 observations. Sample statistics for selected variables appear in Table 1 . 
ESTIMATION STRATEGY
As mentioned above, logit and multinomial logit models are estimated to predict the relative probabilities of occurrence of various injury types. These models are described in standard econometrics texts, such as Greene (1993) , and are only briefly reviewed here. Since the logit is simply a special case of the multinomial logit, only the latter is described. Let j be an index representing a particular injury type with j = 0, 1, 2, . . . J and let i be an index observations. Then the probabilities of injury occurrence for a given observation with worker, job, and establishment characteristics
where β j is a ( ) k × 1 column vector of parameters to be estimated for injury j.
This formulation is fully interacted in the sense that a different set of parameters is estimated for each of the injury types. The model is indeterminate in that only J of the β j 's are identifiable. Customarily, the betas are normalized by assuming
The model can be rewritten in terms of log-odds ratios as
The betas indicate how the explanatory variables affect the probability of an injury of type j relative to the probability of an injury of type zero. Other log-odds ratios between any pair of injury types can be calculated as
In the tables presented below, log-odds parameter estimates are reported for all pair-wise combinations of injury types. This model is estimated by means of weighted maximum likelihood as described in Greene (1993) . In a simple random sample data set, the standard errors of the parameters are estimated using the Hessian matrix of the loglikelihood. However, the structure of the BLS injury survey is more complex, since the sample is stratified with establishments chosen at random within strata potentially contributing multiple injuries (establishments are termed primary sampling units or PSU's). The literature on complex surveys (see Skinner, Hoh, and Smith, 1989) indicates that parameter variances should account for this sampling structure, including the fact that multiple draws from the population of injuries can yield different parameter estimates and the fact that observations within a PSU can be correlated (the simple Hessian matrix assumes independence of all observations).
This study uses a robust variance estimator that incorporates the elements of the sample design. This estimator increases standard errors two and three-fold for some variables, rendering some results statistically insignificant. Let S denote the total number of strata in the sample, one of whose elements is designated by s, let p index the n s PSU's in strata s, let i index observations within PSU's, let H be the Hessian matrix for the weighted sample log-likelihood and let l spi be the log-likelihood for observation i in PSU p in strata s. Further,
where w spi is the observation sample weight. The robust variance estimator of $ β is
where z s is the within-strata mean of z sp . This formula is derived from a firstorder Taylor series expansion of the estimating equations whose solution is $ β .
Another correction to the variances of the logit parameters is made for some of the estimates. The models that include the imputed wage-replacement variable involve two-step estimation procedures. Murphy and Topel (1985) show that failure to account for the two-step process can bias downward the variances of the parameters in the second step. They derive a correction that provides consistent estimates of variances under fairly general conditions. This correction is applied here.
In brief, let L denote the second step weighted log-likelihood (the multinomial logit) and let θ denote the regression parameters from the first step estimation. In the case where the first and second steps are estimated on different data sets, as here, the variance matrix for $ β is:
where H is the weighted Hessian matrix of L as before, V 1 ( $ ) β comes from equation (1) above, Var( $ ) θ is the OLS variance estimator of the parameters from the first step regression, and
Equation (8) is used to estimate the variances of the logit and multinomial logit parameters whenever the imputed wage-replacement variable is included. Otherwise, equation (1) is used.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS

Relative Frequency of Injuries
The first set of empirical results addresses whether workers' compensation increases the proportion of back sprains and carpal tunnel syndrome relative to cuts and fractures. Table 2 represents multinomial logit estimates of the coefficients for the workers' compensation variables for all injury cases with days away from work. As there is some collinearity among the three workers' compensation measures, a variety of model specifications are reported which include combinations of these variables. 6 Not reported in the table are a large number of coefficient estimates for control variables, including an intercept, age, age-squared, and 36 dummy variables for gender, race/Hispanic ethnicity, and length of service at establishment, major occupation, major industry, and establishment size. The standard errors in this table and subsequent tables are calculated from the variance estimators reported in the previous section. State, ten major industry divisions, and whether an establishment has over 500 employees define stratification.
A PSU is identified as an individual establishment.
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The coefficients in Table 2 show the impact of the workers' compensation variables on the log-odds of a given injury type relative to other injury types. The column headings identify the injury types that are in the numerator and the denominator of the log-odds ratios. For example, the table shows that for injuries of all duration's, a unit change in the wage replacement rate, when it is the only workers' compensation variable, raises the log-odds of carpal tunnel syndrome (CTS) relative to fractures by 1.755. This effect is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. The coefficients may be multiplied by the means of the workers' compensation variables to obtain the elasticities of the log-odds ratios with respect to the variables. Thus, the elasticity of the CTS-fracture log-odds ratio with respect to the wage replacement rate is 1.7 (= 1.755 X .976).
An increase in the duration of the waiting period prior to benefit payments decreases the proportion of carpal tunnel syndrome cases relative to cuts and fractures and decreases the proportion of back sprains relative to fractures. These statistically significant effects are consistent with worker-generated claimsreporting moral hazard. In addition, the waiting-period coefficient for the logodds between back sprains and cuts has the proper sign, although it is not 6 States that mandate more generous benefits are more likely to have shorter waiting periods and to allow the worker to choose his or her own doctor. The correlation between the wage replacement variable and the waiting period is -0.24, the correlation between the wage replacement variable and the doctor choice variable is 0.15, and the correlation between the waiting period and doctor choice variables is -0.14. 7 The number of strata in the actual BLS survey is greater than the number of strata used here. The stratification of the survey is based on state, detailed industry, and several size classes. Computationally, it is not possible to include all of these strata in our estimates, since the calculation requires at least 2 PSUs in each stratum. However, some variance estimates not reported here based on different strata definitions indicates that the results are insensitive to the precise strata definitions. statistically significant. The log-odds elasticities for this variable in the statistically significant cases (obtained by multiplying the coefficients by the waiting period mean of 5.2) range from about 0.15 to about 0.40, with the highest elasticity being for the relationship between fractures and carpal tunnel syndrome. Finally, there is no statistically significant evidence that worker choice of doctor affects the relative odds of various injury types. Many of the BLS injury cases are short in duration and are not compensable under any state's workers' compensation laws. To see whether the effect of workers' compensation on the distribution of injuries is greater for cases that are potentially compensable (at least in some states), the analysis is repeated on the subset of injury cases lasting more than three days. These results are reported in Table 3 . The results in Table 3 are similar to those in Table 2 . As before, increasing the wage replacement rate raises the proportion of carpal tunnel syndrome cases relative to all other injuries and, consistent with the hypothesis that the effects are larger for cases that are more likely to be compensable, the benefit-log-odds elasticities are slightly larger. The coefficients for the wage replacement rate variable are not statistically significant for the proportions of back sprains relative to cuts or fractures, although the coefficients for the back-sprain-fractures logodds have the anticipated sign and increase relative to Table 2. Increasing the waiting period raises fractures relative to both back sprains and carpal tunnel syndrome, with small increases in elasticities. However, the impact of the waiting period on the carpal tunnel-cut log-odds ratio is no longer statistically significant. Again, the doctor choice variable is never statistically significant.
While the log-odds estimates indicate the relative effects of the workers' compensation variables, it is difficult to get a sense of the magnitude of the effects on the distribution of injuries. To do this, one can employ the method of recycled predictions, whereby a variable of interest is varied across the data set (holding all other variables constant) and the predicted proportions are averaged. Table 4 shows the distribution changes implied by two models, one with only the wage replacement rate and another where the waiting period is added. Recycled predictions were generated for all injury cases and for those lasting more than three workdays. No simulations are done with the doctor choice variable because of its statistical insignificance. In the simulations, the wage replacement ratio is increased from 0.93 to 1.03, or 10 percent of the sample mean. The most noticeable effects are a decline in the proportion of fractures and an increase in the proportion of carpal tunnel syndrome cases, with larger effects for cases lasting more than three days. The increase in the proportion of carpal tunnel cases ranges from 0.4 to 0.6 percentage points, which, although not large on a percentage point basis, is large relative to the proportion of carpal tunnel cases. The proportions of back sprains and cuts remain relatively unchanged, with the largest increase in sprains from 61.3 to 61.7 percentage points or about 0.7 percent. When the waiting period is included in the model, an increase in the wage-replacement rate anomalously lowers the proportion of back sprains, although the effect is very small. In contrast to these results, the multinomial logit estimates of Butler, Durbin, and Helvacian (1996) indicate that a 10 percent increase in the replacement rate increases sprains by 1.25 percent. Their analysis includes only workers' compensation claims, and does not assess the impact of the waiting period, and contains a category of "all other injuries". Also, unlike the analysis here, the Butler, Durbin, and Helvacian study shows the proportion of fractures anomalously increasing with the replacement rate.
In another simulation, the waiting period was increased 10 percent around its sample mean, from 4.9 to 5.4 days. The distribution changes are in expected directions but are quite small, despite the statistical significance of the waiting period variable in a number of the log-odds ratios. At most, in the sample of cases lasting more than three days, an increase in the waiting period reduces the percentage of sprains from 61.4 to 61.1, while increasing the percentage of fractures from 18.6 to 18.9. The distribution changes are smaller in the sample of all injury cases, as expected. These modest results are, of course, consistent with the small elasticities reported in Tables 2 and 3 . Of course, interstate variation in the waiting period, from three to seven days, is much larger than the 10 percent change simulated here, resulting in larger distributional effects.
In sum, there is some evidence that a higher wage replacement rate and a shorter waiting period increase the fraction of hard-to-diagnose injuries relative to those that are easier-to-diagnose. These variables are statistically significant for a number of log-odds comparisons. However, with the exception of the effect of the replacement rate on carpal tunnel syndrome, the effects are quite modest. Further, there is no evidence that the worker choice of doctor has any effect on the injury distribution.
The Monday Effect
This section investigates the possibility that workers' compensation increases the proportion of back sprain cases that are reported on Monday relative to Monday cuts and fractures. It is hypothesized that more generous workers' compensation benefits and worker selection of a doctor increase the likelihood that a worker will try to report an off-the-job injury as occurring on-the-job. Because there is a longer duration of non-work time just before Mondays and the first workday after a long weekend ("Mondays"), it is hypothesized that a greater proportion of nonwork-related injuries are claimed on Mondays. Further, since it is easier to conceal a hard-to-diagnose injury, this Monday effect should be more important for these injuries.
The empirical strategy is to estimate logits that explain the occurrence of a Monday injury. The dependent variable is an indicator of whether an injury is reported on Monday (or the day after a long weekend). In addition to the control variables included in the previous analysis, explanatory variables include dummy variables for types of injury, the three workers' compensation variables, and interactions of the workers' compensation variables with the injury dummy variables. The injury variables alone indicate whether Monday injuries are more likely for a particular type of injury. The workers' compensation variables alone indicate whether Monday injuries are more likely when benefits are more generous or when the worker can choose his or her own doctor. Finally, the interactions of the workers' compensation variables with the injury dummy variables constitute the strongest test of whether worker claims-reporting moral hazard generates the results, since they indicate whether workers' compensation is more likely to induce the Monday reporting of hard-to-diagnose off-the-job injuries.
Carpal tunnel syndrome cases are dropped for the analysis in this section. Since these are known to be cumulative, there is no reason for a worker suffering from this condition to wait until Monday to report an off-the-job occurrence of this type. Rather, the timing of carpal tunnel cases is more likely to coincide with when a worker chooses to have an operation or other treatment for the condition. Table 5 shows the percentage of injury cases occurring on Monday by nature of injury. Consistent with Smith (1990) , a higher fraction of back sprains are reported on Monday as compared to either cuts or fractures. This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that workers report more hard-to-diagnose off-thejob injuries as occurring on the job. But these finding might also arise for ergonomic reasons -workers need to "warm up" when they start a new workweek and back sprains are especially affected by this. Stronger evidence that the finding is generated by moral hazard would be that the Monday phenomenon is more prevalent when benefits are high. Table 5 shows other interesting results. All injuries occur on Mondays more than 20.5 percent of the time, which is the proportion of Mondays (and days after long weekends) in the sample universe. All of the percentages in Table 5 are statistically significantly greater than 20.5, at least at the 10 percent level. This suggests that even some easy-to-diagnose off-the-job injuries are reported on Mondays, although it is also possible that there are "warm up" effects for all injury types. Another finding in the table suggests that a higher fraction of longer duration injuries, especially cuts and fractures are reported on Monday. This could result if more severe injury cases occur on Monday for ergonomic reasons. However, it could also reflect that workers tend to stay off work a whole week, so that Monday cases would tend to be longer and a sample of longer duration cases would tend to skew toward those reported on Monday. This would especially affect cuts, with a median duration of four days away from work. Table 6 reports logit estimates of the probability of a Monday injury for cases of all duration's. Column 1 indicates that even after controlling for a set of worker and establishment characteristics, Monday injuries are still more likely for sprains (the omitted category) than for cuts and fractures. The coefficients for the cut and fracture dummy variables are both negative and statistically significant. The other columns report models that include combinations of the workers' compensation variables that are interacted with the cut and fracture dummy variables to detect differential effects. An important finding is that an increase in the wage replacement rate increases the probability of a Monday injury of any type. The uninteracted wagereplacement variable, measuring the effect for sprains, is positive and statistically significant for all models. Further, the interactions of this variable with the cut and fracture dummy variables are not statistically significant, although they have the expected negative signs. This indicates that one cannot reject the hypothesis that a higher wage replacement rate has the same effect on Monday cuts and fractures as on Monday sprains. The finding that the wage-replacement rate increases the fraction of Monday injuries of all types contrasts with Card and McCall (1995) , who find no effect.
Another finding is that when a worker can choose his or her own doctor, he or she is more likely to report a Monday injury. As with the wage-replacement ratio, this result seems to hold for all injury types. The coefficient on the uninteracted doctor choice dummy variable is positive and statistically significant, while its interaction with the two injury dummy variables are positive and statistically insignificant. Finally, there is no evidence that the waiting period affects the frequency of Monday injuries. Table 7 replicates the analysis for cases lasting more than 3 days, since these are more likely to be compensated. In all cases, a higher replacement rate increases the frequency of all Monday injuries lasting more than 3 days (though the effect is not statistically significant in the logit with all workers' compensation variables), while there is no effect of the waiting period. The only difference from the previous results is that doctor choice, while positively related to the probability of a Monday injury for sprains and cuts, is not statistically significant. However, worker choice of doctor does increase the probability of Monday fractures.
Like the multinomial logit estimates, the logit estimates reported here are not very intuitive. To assess the impacts of the replacement rate and doctor choice variables, the method of recycled predictions is used. The mean predicted probabilities of Monday injuries are generated by alternately setting the replacement rate variable at 0.93 and 1.03 (representing a 10 percent variation in that variable). Setting the doctor choice variable at 0 and 1 generates similar means. Table 8 reports these means by injury type for two logit equations estimated on the full sample and on the sample of cases lasting more than 3 days. Simulations were not undertaken for the statistically insignificant waiting period variable.
These simulations reinforce the finding that both the replacement rate and the doctor choice variables increase the frequencies of all Monday injuries. The replacement rate raises Monday injuries the least for cuts. Among all injuries the replacement-rate effect is greatest for back sprains (about 1.5 percentage points), while for injuries lasting more than 3 days, the effect is greatest for fractures (at or over 2 percentage points). Fractures show the greatest increase in Monday injuries when all workers can choose their own doctor, while back sprains show the smallest percentage point increase.
In sum, while Monday back sprains are more frequent than Monday cuts or fractures, there is no evidence that workers' compensation differentially increases the likelihood of a Monday back sprain. However, more generous wage replacement and the workers' choice of a doctor do raise the probability that any type of injury is reported on Monday (or the day after a long weekend) relative to other weekdays. These results are consistent with worker-generated claimsreporting moral hazard, except that the moral hazard occurs for all types of injuries, not simply for those that are hard to diagnose. 
CONCLUSION
This article provides modest evidence that workers' compensation increases the proportion of hard-to-diagnose injuries relative to those that are easier to diagnose, but while higher workers' compensation benefits do increase the probability Monday injuries, there is no differential effect by type of injury. Both a higher replacement rate and a shorter waiting period increase the proportion carpal tunnel cases, while a shorter waiting period raises back sprains relative to cuts and fractures. All other effects are statistically insignificant and only the effect of the replacement rate on carpal tunnel syndrome is large in magnitude. The logits on the probability of a Monday injury suggest that higher benefits and, possibly, worker choice of doctor increase the frequency of all Monday injuries relative to those occurring on other workdays, with no statistically significant difference between back sprains, cuts, and fractures. Some caution should be applied to interpreting the results. This study has used cross-state variation to infer how workers' compensations' affects the relative frequency of injuries. There may be other parameters of the workers' compensation systems (or other state specific variables) that are not included in the models estimated here that influence injuries and that are correlated with the workers' compensation variables included here. For example, states that mandate more generous benefits may also be more lenient in allowing claims. Thus, as in all studies of this sort, there is a danger of omitted variable bias in the estimated worker' compensation effects.
Estimation of fixed effect models, using more than one year of data, can control for some of these problems. However, for these models to work, the policy variables of interest must change over time. Some workers' compensation variables, such as the waiting period, rarely change. It is not possible to measure the impact of time invariant variables on the relative frequencies of injuries using a fixed effect approach. Further, the omitted variable bias problem is solved only through fixed effect estimation if changes in the observed policy variables are not accompanied by changes in unmeasured policy variables. A state that becomes more generous in one dimension may do so in other dimensions as well, as, for example, when legislation increases both the wage-replacement rate and stipulates the recognition of conditions previously not recognized as work-related. Thus, future research that seeks to improve on strictly cross-sectional analyses, like the one conducted here, should include both a cross-section time-series data set covering a number of changes in workers' compensation variables and measures of all policy variables thought to affect the distribution of injuries.
